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the Unfair Practices Act. If, however, the inapplicability of the doctrine in these
cases needs any justification, other than the provisions relied upon in the Business
and Professions Code, perhaps it can best be rationalized by using the language of
a California case2 4 which construed the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Act
and stated:
"That the prevention of monopolies and the fostering of free, open and fair competi-
tion and the prohibition of unfair trade practices is in the public welfare is obvious, and
requires no further citation of authority."
The court in the instant case very possibly could have arrived at the same
decision based upon the applicable prior analogous exceptions which have been
judicially recognized in California. Thus, the effect of these statutes is to remove
any doubt existing regarding the discretionary power of the courts in these cases,
and instead, make it mandatory for the trial judge to issue the injunction notwith-
standing the plaintiff's unclean hands. It is submitted that these statutes are in accord
with good public policy and existing equitable principles, based upon the analogous
exceptions mentioned previously. Charles William Luther.
EVIDENCE: ADOPTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CALIFORNIA. The deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court in People v. Cahan' has been the object of
much concern in California. In this case, most of the evidence against 16 persons
charged with conspiracy to engage in horse-race bookmaking was obtained by officers
of the Los Angeles Police Department. Such evidence was obtained in violation
of the United States and California Constitutions 2 and state and federal statutes.8
After securing the permission of the chief of police to make microphone installations
at two places occupied by the defendant, officers entered through a side window
and placed a listening device under a chest of drawers. About a month later, a
similar device was installed in another house and receiving equipment was set up
in garages near both establishments. Such equipment was used for the purpose of
recording and transcribing the conversations that came over the wires. In addition,
there was a mass of evidence obtained through entries which were made by kicking
down the front door and other searches and seizures made without search warrants.
Such evidence was held to be inadmissible, thus reversing the lower court's findings.
Heretofore, there had been an unbroken line of decisions adopting the non-exclusion-
ary rule, a well-established rule of evidence in this state. The Cahan decision broke
this line, thus placing California among those jurisdictions which adhere to the
federal exclusionary rule.
Many cases, strongly resembling the Cahan case, have previously been before
the California courts. They have consistently been decided by holding the non-
exclusionary rule to be the law, not the exclusionary rule. Will an examination of
cases decided by both rules provide an answer for the sudden reversal?
The adoption of the exclusionary rule is based upon the principle that some
consideration extrinsic to the investigation of truth is regarded as more important
2 Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 646, 82 P.2d
3, 10, 118 A.L.R. 486 (1938).
1- Cal.2d - , 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
2 U. S. CONST. amend. IV; CALIF. CONST. Art. I, § 19.
8 CALIF. PEN. CODE § 653h; 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
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and overpowering.4 Thus this principle is extended by the decision in Boyd v. U.S.5
to the use of evidence obtained by violation of the Fourth Amendment (as well as
that of the Fifth Amendment). The United States Supreme Court was unable to
perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him was substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself. However, 19 years later in Adams v. New York,6 the Supreme Court held
that questions of admissibility are limited by the weight of authority, as well as
reason, to cases involving violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court asserted that
it does not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was obtained.
A feeble attempt was made here to reconcile this decision with the Bojd case by
showing that the latter was settled primarily on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The effect of the Adams decision was short-lived when Weeks v. United States7 was
decided. Here the court was confronted with evidence obtained by entry without
a warrant and a subsequent seizure of letters and private documents; this evidence
was taken from the defendant who was under suspicion of illegally using the mails
for gambling purposes. The court said if such evidence was allowed to be used,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment would have no value and ought to be stricken
from the Constitution, since the court and its officials are not to be aided by sacri-
ficing constitutional principles. As distinguished from the Adams decision, the Weeks
decision required the defendant, prior to the opening of his trial, to seek restitution
of the property desired for use as evidence. However, such a distinction has not been
strictly enforced and motions to return illegally obtained evidence have been granted
subsequent to the opening of trial. Thus the expansive effect which results from the
Weeks decision gives substance to the view that the Supreme Court's position is based
upon the principle that protection under the Fourth Amendment-to the extent of
excluding evidence obtained in violation of this amendment-will be maintained at
an unyielding level.
It appears that the limitations which govern the exclusion of evidence have
expanded beyond evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Justification was found by the courts to render inadmissible, evidence obtained by
federal officers who have intercepted interstate and intrastate communications by
tapping telephone wires. The exclusion of intercepted interstate communications was
based on an interpretation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,8 in Nardone v.
United States.9 Similarly, the leiss case'0 decided that intercepted intrastate com-
munications would be treated in the same manner as the Nardone case treated inter-
state communications. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court's decisions were
claimed to have been founded by applying the applicable statute, such statute was
open to various interpretations. It does not seem to be exaggerating when it is said
that the interpretation that was applied here was extremely liberal and strangely
conformant to the principle invoked in other exclusionary cases, especially the dis-
senting opinions in the Olmstead case. 1 ' In the Olmstead dissent, the need was
stressed for a wider application of the exclusionary principle; it should extend farther
'8 WIGUORE, EVmENCE § 2175 (3d ed. 1940).116 U.S. 616 (1885).
o 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
7 232 U.S. 383 (1913).
847 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
S302 U.S. 379 (1937).
" Weiss v. U. S., 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
" Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
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than to the mischief which gave it birth. Subsequent federal decisions have main-
tained the principle which prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence.
Up to the time of the Cahan case, consonant decisions have admitted the use
of illegally obtained evidence in California courts in accordance with the common-
law rule. In 1909, in People v. LeDoux,'1 2 the California Supreme Court did not take
cognizance of the mode in which evidence was produced when dealing with the
question of admissibility. However, this decision was rendered before the Supreme
Court of the United States handed down the Weeks decision. The test whether a
conflicting rule would be adopted by the California Supreme Court was yet to be
made. Subsequently, People v. Mayen'3 established California as one of the leading
proponents of the non-exclusionary rule when they followed the LeDoux decision
(notwithstanding the fact that Weeks v. United States had been decided in the
interim). Reversing the decision of the lower court which was founded upon strict
adherence to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said that the violation of the Fourth Amendment and the use
of evidence obtained thereby were distinct transactions and had no necessary or
inherent relation to each other. The evidence here was taken from the defendant's
home by a detective without a proper search warrant, the warrant describing the
property to be taken as personal goods and certain paraphernalia. Thus the admission
of relevant evidence, even though obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure,
may be made in a state court; the decision in Wolf v. Colorado14 held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid such admission by the state courts. Similarly,
evidence obtained by wire-tapping has been held to be admissibleY5
Many cases following the Mayen case have encountered the problem of admitting
illegally obtained evidence. In all of these cases, the following issues have appeared
numerous times:
1. Whether the court's attempt to enact the federal exclusionary rule is an
unwarranted violation of the doctrine of separation of power, public policy demanding
such changes to be made by the Legislature?
2. Whether adoption would imply that the guarantee of the Fourth Amend-
ment is enforceable against the states through the due process clause?
3. Whether the exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of evidence gained by
unreasonable search and seizure is an effective method of preventing abuses?
4. Whether the result of the exclusionary rule will introduce confusion and
inconsistencies into the law of criminal procedure?
These issues which were provoked by the Cahan case have confronted the courts
since the Mayen decision. It does not appear that new light has been shed upon the
problem which says in effect that any reasonable person could not fail to see the
desirability of resolving these issues in favor of adopting the exclusionary rule.
The explanation of the sudden reversal is not to be found by a deeper insight into
these issues. It appears that the answer to the Cahan case is a social policy choice,
which decisions in conflicting opinions have brought out.
The choice to be made is between two socially desirable objects, both of which
we cannot have. The object that criminals should be detected and to that end all
available evidence should be used is conflicting with the object that the government
" 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909).
"s 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922).
14338 U.S. 25 (1949).
People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d 169, 137 P.2d 72 (1952) ; People v. Vertleib, 22 Cal.2d 193,
137 P.2d 437 (1943) ; People v. Channell, 107 C.A.2d 192, 236 P.2d 654 (1951) ; People v. Sica,
112 C.A.2d 574, 247 P.2d 72 (1952).
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should not foster and pay for crimes when they are the means by which the evidence
is obtained. Justice Cardozo, a proponent of the non-exclusionary rule, recognizes
the choice:
"The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a
disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that
crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by
the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice."' 6
A choice was made by the Cahan decision.
As the decision points out, it has not yet been held that the federal exclusionary
rule is a command of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. The exclusionary rule
is a judicially declared, self-imposed rule of evidence.
This self-imposed rule decided that a new choice must be made. The public policy
question has been resolved. The California court no longer wished to participate in
and condone the lawless activities of its officials. No doubt the decision in the Cahan
case has been influenced by decisions which have had an embarrassing effect upon
California.
In the widely known Lisenba"' and Rochin' s cases, the activities of state law
enforcement officers have been thoroughly denounced by the United States Supreme
Court. In the former case, the court asserted that: "officers of the law must realize
that if they indulge in such practices they may, in the end, defeat rather than further
the ends of justice. Their lawless activities here took them close to the line."' 19 In this
case, the defendant was questioned continually for 48 hours, slapped and hMld by
force without indictment or warrant of arrest. In the Rochin case, three deputy
sheriffs forcibly entered the defendant's home, attempted to open his mouth to extract
narcotic capsules which he swallowed, and forcibly extracted the contents of his
stomach. The means by which the evidence was obtained was described by Justice
Frankfurter as "conduct which shocks the conscience. . . .This course of proceed-
ing by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities.120 The Cahan opinion, in describing the current concern in the police
state, refers directly to the Rochin case when it maintains that the step from lawless,
though efficient law enforcement, to the stamping out of human rights is indeed short.
California continued to be embarrassed on a national scale by the United States
Supreme Court in Irvine v. California.2 ' Although the Supreme Court held that the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by illegal means was a problem for the indi-
vidual states, the justices were unanimous in condemning the police conduct as
."... repulsive,... smacking of the police state, ... frightening,.. surveillance,
.f. an invasion of privacy flagrantly, deliberately and persistently violative of the funda-
mental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment." 22
Here the police had entered the defendant's home while he was absent and
wired the hall, bedroom and closet until the purpose of enabling the officers to obtain
evidence of gambling was accomplished.
The Cahan opinion reaches its conclusion because the California courts failed
to cope with problems like the above. It seems that the effect of the Cahan decision
'- People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 18, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).17California v. Lisenba, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
"Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
29 314 U.S. at 240.
,o 342 U.S. at 165.21347 U.S. 128 (1954).
1" Id. at 132.
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